Throwing a Bone To A Starving Dog

August 20, 2007
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There sure has been a lot of nonsensical gibberish flying around the financial infomercial media, and in the world of blogs and message boards since Friday. So let’s try to separate fact from fantasy.

We’ll start with something I agree with. I do believe that the Fed’s action had everything to do with Countrywide’s bank arm, the well publicized run by their customers, and the fact that they were forced to borrow apparently all of their $11 billion bank credit facility. This is a dangerous and volatile mix in the arena of the public confidence game that fiat money systems depend on. The Fed had to do “something” to give the world the impression that they were actually “doing” something.

What did they actually do? Not much.

Countrywide Securities Corporation is one of the Fed’s 21 primary dealers. They are a direct participant in the Fed’s daily open market operation repo auctions. If the Fed was going to prop up anyone, this group would be first in line. And given that the vast majority of Countrywide’s assets are residential MBS, clearly they would stand to be the first of the first in this situation. The Fed’s actions on Friday were designed to soothe the fears of the biggest financial actors, the market, and the public in regard to the apparently sudden meltdown of this one particular bad actor.

But the Fed did not lower rates. It didn’t even increase the monetary base. It just put on a show designed to keep the public con going.

Any depositary institution can borrow at the discount window, but it is essentially only an emergency facility for banks that do not have access to the Fed Funds market for whatever reason. The rate at the discount window has been set at a premium of 1% above the Fed Funds rate since the Fed changed the policy on use of the discount window in January 2003. All Friday’s move effectively did was to lower the premium for these emergency loans to problem children by 1/2%. And right now Countrywide is the Fed’s seriously delinquent teenager in big trouble with the law.

So is the Fed’s action as a big deal as the market’s subsequent action and the punditic (yeah, I just made up that word) euphoria would have you believe?

No.

The Fed does not buy securities at the discount window. It makes emergency loans there, and since the rate is at a premium to the market, no one would use the Window if they weren’t in deep squat and were locked out of the Fed Funds market. How much lending is done at that Window? As of Wednesday of last week the total outstanding was $294 million. Not billion, million! Compare this with the total size of the Fed’s asset base of over $800 billion, and you get some idea of how truly insignificant the Fed’s symbolic ploy was.

But the market took the bait, hook, line, and sinker. The flipping and flopping will be something to see when the fish have their oxygen cut off.

I’ve seen a lot of misinformed discussion that the Fed is signaling that it is or will be buying the bad MBS securities. Not only does the Fed not buy bad securities, the Fed does not buy MBS securities. At least they haven’t yet. They hold no such securities in the System Open Market Account. In fact, as this accounting shows, they reduced the SOMA by over a billion in the week ended 8/15, and cut another $6 billion on Friday. In a move that I missed during the week, the Fed took the rare action of not rolling over about a billion of its maturing Treasury notes. They virtually always roll over 100% of the maturing paper they hold in the SOMA. The action of allowing paper to expire unannounced is a stealthy way of cutting the monetary base without anyone noticing. So, while the Fed Funds rate had traded well below the Fed’s target of 5.25% throughout the week, by Friday’s Open
Market Operations they had gotten the rate back to 5.35%.

This is not a sign of a Fed that has eased policy. Maybe that will change next week, but all we have so far is a few skillfully placed words designed to keep the con going. It’s a bit of a chess game. The Fed made its move, and now they will wait to see how the market reacts. If the boyz on Liberty Street and Wall Street are now patting themselves on the back at the moment, I suspect their self congratulations will be short lived, because there really is a liquidity crisis out there. There’s simply too much bad paper not paying the claims against it, and not being worth what the mark to model fairy tale said it was worth.

The market’s recovery was based in part on the expectation that the Fed may buy some of the bad MBS paper and magically transform bad to good. That expectation is likely to be one of those false assumptions that George Soros talked about. He said something to the effect that it is the speculator’s job to recognize the false trend, ride it, and exit before the crowd wakes up. I haven’t done the charts yet this weekend, but I suspect that the trend driven by this false premise may last all of a day and a half. We’ll see.

My guess is that the Fed will allow the worst of the crap credit and the crappy players to disappear from the firmament, but will save its firepower to save the biggest players in the banking system when the time comes. And that time is coming.

I was away from the trading screens Friday afternoon, and I was listening to Gloomboomberg in the car. (I like Gloomboomberg Radio by the way. They tend to do real reportage and be pretty even handed.) One of the pundits (I think McCulley of Pimco) made the point that the real reason for the rally was the Fed’s statement in the morning, because the Fed suddenly woke up and found that the downside risk to the economy had ”increased appreciably,” which was a big change from their more muted statement regarding downside risks at the Fed meeting last week.

Well, Surprise, surprise surprise! Can you imagine that?

Here’s what they said.

Financial market conditions have deteriorated, and tighter credit conditions and increased uncertainty have the potential to restrain economic growth going forward. In these circumstances, although recent data suggest that the economy has continued to expand at a moderate pace, the Federal Open Market Committee judges that the downside risks to growth have increased appreciably. The Committee is monitoring the situation and is prepared to act as needed to mitigate the adverse effects on the economy arising from the disruptions in financial markets.”

The players took this as a signal that the Fed will cut the Fed Funds rate imminently and that that is wildly bullish.

It sounds to me that the Fed was saying that the Wall Street Journal’s ”Best Economy in World History” may just be on the verge of collapse. The market’s knee jerk reaction was to judge that as bullish.

We’ll just have to see about that. As to the market’s apparent judgment that this was a policy loosening, the Fed stopped using the discount rate to set policy in 400 BC. Friday’s move was not a policy move. The Fed just cut the premium at Benny’s Pawn and Discount Drive Up Window for Problem Children — a mean, futile, and stupid gesture.

So far in this crisis, the Fed has NOT injected one cent of liquidity into the system except for that two day bulge on Thursday and Friday August 9-10, which they completely removed by Monday and Tuesday 8/13-14. The Fed remains tight in terms of the SOMA, and making matters worse, foreign central banks are dumping Treasuries to raise cash for injection into their own system in order to try and fix the extreme dollar squeeze in European credit markets. Last week they reduced their custodial holdings at the Fed by a record $17 billion. They actually sold $22 billion of Treasuries, but apparently the Asian central banks are still propping the GSE market as they bought $5 billion in Agencies.

We’ll just have to see if the world’s central banks have the firepower to stop a worldwide credit crunch and liquidity squeeze when some major players are essentially insolvent because dey ain’t no assets backing those ASSet backed securities. Rather than taking decisive action, it looks to me like the Fed is frozen in place like a deer staring into the headlights of an 80 mile per hour downhill runaway tractor trailer, while the ECB is fighting its crisis the only way it can, by selling Treasuries and injecting the cash into their system.

The fact is that the Fed remains shockingly tight in terms of the monetary base, which they have maintained at ZERO growth for the past 8 months, and LESS THAN ZERO in the past week when the sheet was hitting the fan. Sure that can all change next week, but you wouldn’t know it from the actions they took on Friday.

At this point, the cut at the discount window looks like nothing more than throwing a bone to a starving dog. Big freaking deal. Watch what they do, not what they say. It seems to me that they either don’t yet have a handle on the magnitude of the crisis, or they think that smoke and mirrors will fool everyone into thinking that happy days are here again and that the credit markets will “unfreeze” as a result. But so far, they haven’t “done” anything.

Finally, put this in your pipe and smoke it. This hasn’t been reported in the media but last week a $9 billion fund of hedge funds made a cash request of $500 million from the institutional money market fund where they hold their idle cash. For the first time ever, this fund of funds didn’t receive the cash immediately. As of Friday they had been waiting two days. They are still waiting, and there has been no word on how long it will take until they get their money. This is a fund that earlier took a $600 million hit on the Amaranth fiasco. And they are still waiting for the $165 million or so that they were supposed to receive from the liquidation.

This is just one fund folks. There are others in similar situations, perhaps hundreds, perhaps thousands of funds.

The run on the bank is only just beginning. Is the Fed’s Friday smoke and mirrors act going to change that?

I doubt it.

Lee Adler is the Editor and Publisher of the Wall Street Examiner and Wall Street Examiner Professional Edition. For daily updates on this ongoing saga get a risk free trial to the Wall Street Examiner Professional Edition Money, Liquidity and Real Estate service.

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49 Responses to Throwing a Bone To A Starving Dog

  1. FranSix on August 20, 2007 at 2:38 pm

    And on a more ironic note, the recent liquidity injections went over swimmingly well for Asian markets.

  2. Luis on August 21, 2007 at 11:29 am

    The real news are that about 7 million people are lossing their home in america today, and there is no help from the goverment,the banks are tighting the way the do buisines with the public, no more creative lending, or sub prime loans for people with no such a good credit, the question is what is going to happen with our investments?, are there any mortgage securities in my 401K or retirement plan?, the truth is that if this situation keeps going on more people is bound to lose their homes interest rates are bound to go up and we could see the highest interest rates ever. the truth must be told and I think this is a hunt for the mid class people.Wellcome to the third world……

  3. flow5 on August 21, 2007 at 12:55 pm

    “Also, the past few years have been the first time the discount rate has been kept above the fed funds rate. Even during Volcker’s supposed tightening campaign, he “left the back door open,” as Rob Landis put it.”

    Yeah they made it a penalty rate – about 25 years too late (and now at the wrong time). And Paul Volcker executed the easiest monetary policy ever. And Bernanke is following the tightest monetary policy ever. If anyone in charge can get us out of this mess it’s Bernanke. He should be given a life-time post as Chairman.

  4. CCG on August 21, 2007 at 2:31 pm

    “And Paul Volcker executed the easiest monetary policy ever.”

    http://goldensextant.com/SavingtheSystem.html

    ‘The Maestro, no slouch himself in the monetary reserve creation department, was a piker in comparison to post-Penn Square Volcker.’

    “the banks are tighting the way the do buisines with the public, no more creative lending, or sub prime loans for people with no such a good credit”

    http://www.mises.org/mysteryofbanking/mysteryofbanking.pdf

    ‘The Fed tried frantically to inflate after the 1929 crash, including massive open market purchases and heavy loans to banks. These attempts succeeded in driving interest rates down, but they foundered on the rock of massive distrust of the banks. Furthermore, bank fears of runs as well as bankruptcies by their borrowers led them to pile up excess reserves in a manner not seen before or since the 1930s.’

    http://www.mises.org/rothbard/historyofmoney.pdf

    ‘[T]he inflationary policies of Hoover and [Federal Reserve Board Governor Eugene] Meyer proved to be counterproductive. American citizens lost confidence in the banks and demanded cash – Federal Reserve notes – for their deposits (currency in circulation rising by $122 million by the end of July), while foreigners lost confidence in the dollar and demanded gold (the gold stock in the United States falling by $380 million in this period). In addition, the banks, for the first time, did not fully lend out their new reserves, and accumulated excess reserves – these excess reserves rising to 10 percent of total reserves by mid-year. A common explanation claims that business, during a depression, lowered its demand for loans, so that pumping new reserves into the banks was only “pushing on a string.” But this popular view overlooks the fact that banks can always use their excess reserves to buy existing securities; they don’t have to wait for new loan requests. Why didn’t they do so? Because the banks were whipsawed between two forces. On the one hand, bank failures had increased dramatically during the depression. Whereas during the 1920s, in a typical year 700 banks failed, with deposits totaling $170 million, since the depression struck, 17,000 banks had been failing per year, with a total of $1.08 billion in deposits. This increase in bank failures could give any bank pause, especially since all the banks knew in their hearts that, as fractional reserve banks, none of them could withstand determined and massive runs upon them by their depositors. Second, just at a time when bank loans were becoming risky, the cheap-money policy of the Fed had driven down interest returns from bank loans, thus weakening banks’ incentive to bear risk. Hence the piling up of excess reserves. The more that Hoover and the Fed tried to inflate, the more worried the market and the public became about the dollar, the more gold flowed out of the banks, and the more deposits were redeemed for cash.’

    Congrats, Lee, on this article being mentioned by Mike Shedlock.

  5. Lee Adler on August 21, 2007 at 3:36 pm

    Indeed. Thanks to Mish and the dozens of other bloggers and message board posters who linked in to this article.

    Special thanks to Aaron Krowne who got the ball rolling over at ml-implode.com and hf-implode.com and sent us over 5,000 visitors with his link!

  6. flow5 on August 21, 2007 at 8:11 pm

    Fiat’s Reprieve: Saving the System, 1979-1987, by Bob Landis
    The Making of a Legend: Volcker the Monetarist: Chairman Volcker was no doubt many things, a monetarist he was not.

    That’s the first article I’ve read about Volcker that had the right idea. I enjoyed it.

    No Volcker didn’t try monetarism, but Ben Bernanke is (the first).

    The real problem lies with the bankers, their lobbyist, and the ABA (any discourse would end in libel)

    And there are technical problems: the monetary base is not a base for the expansion of the money supply. Monetarism involves targeting total reserves not non-borrowed reserves.
    Monetarism involves targeting monetary flows (MVt), not any particular monetary aggregate. The “price” of money is the inverse of the price level. The “supply of and demand for money” is Keynesian dogma & bogus.
    My take is that Mises lacks an adequate knowledge of money & central banking and that he would have likely performed worse than Volcker.

  7. CCG on August 22, 2007 at 2:50 am

    Glad you enjoyed it flow5. Landis draws the material on Volcker from Richard Timberlake’s “Monetary Policy in the United States: An Intellectual and Institutional History”. As Timberlake put it, “monetarism as an official central-bank policy had neither failed nor succeeded. It simply had never been tried.”

    Supply of and demand for money make sense if you remember that money begins life as just another commodity. Rothbard’s “Man, Economy and State” says who pointed this out – I can’t remember the name, but the idea is older than Keynes.

    Mises would abolish central banking, so in one sense you’re right that he’d be a worse central banker than Volcker.

    If Bernanke really means to turn off the spigot, then he’s pulled a hell of a headfake over the years with his helicopter speeches and apologies to Milton Friedman (for the Fed supposedly not reflating enough after 1929). But I don’t think the credit belongs to him any more than it did to Volcker. I see the bubble as collapsing under the weight of lender and borrower exhaustion.

  8. flow5 on August 22, 2007 at 7:11 am

    Mises is a theorist. He has solid concepts but I don’t see how he applies them. So I can’t use – say the velocity concept that he describes even though I think he is on to something.

    “An increase in the demand for money is concomitantly associated with an equal and opposite decrease in the supply of money, and vice versa; and that an increase in the supply of money is concomitantly associated with an equal and opposite decrease in the demand for money & vice versa.”

    “The demand for money should not be confused with the demand for loan-funds. The demand for loan-funds is not a demand for money, per se, but a demand which reflects the advantages of spending borrowed money. Insofar as there is a relationship it may be said that an increase in the demand for loan-funds tends to be associated with a decrease in the demand for money.”

    The Fed is extremely “tight”. The rate of change in the proxy for inflation (MVt) has declined in 17 of the last 18 months. That’s a very tight monetary policy.

  9. flow5 on August 22, 2007 at 7:47 am

    the demand for money….

    That’s why a flight from the U.S. dollar will produce hyperinflation in terms of dollar denominated assets.

    “Alfred Marshall, the Cambridge economists, is responsible for developing the cash-balances approach to money. For example, if individuals collectively desire expanding their cash balances (increasing the period over whose transactions purchasing power in the form of money is held), they will initiate a chain of events which will lead to a net reduction in their aggregate holdings of cash. That is, an over-all increase in the demand for money leads to falling prices, a decline in profit expectations, reduced borrowing from the banks — and therefore a smaller volume of cash balances. Money thus is truly a paradox – by wanting more, the public ends up with less, and by wanting less, it ends up with more. All motives which induce the holding of a larger volume of money will tend to increase the demand for money – and reduce its velocity.”

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